considerable social intercourse between the two groups. Unfortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq, took service with the British, particularly in the infantry Levy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in crushing two Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled in the Rowanduz area, at Dotez, Dara Harir and Dyana, and, while outwardly amicable, the Kurds feel toward them a certain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance with the British, especially in the lucrative occupations of the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, the Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as are able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native group are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of their daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them. One can find Muslims in Baghdad with American, British, or German wives, but never Armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. Muslim girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim woman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent danger of being slain by their relatives, and the Baghdad press is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of them assume Christian names, often of a sinuous favorite, and wear a cross conspicuously on the breast, thereby outwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam commands tremendous respect from its followers and is a "proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A Muslim may be cursed by a non-Muslim to a certain point,

Iraq the [Sunni] is represented by most of the Arab groups, 795
the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans. The conflict be- 779
tween the two, often with violent political expressions, is 175
much the same as that between Catholic and Protestant in [578]
Germany, although there is little analogy in the type of
religious contest. The governing class in Iraq, deriving
from Ottoman times, is about half Sunnite, and the dis- 795
cussion is often phrased along ethnic lines, Arab and Turk 196
against Arab and Persian. Certain practices, such as [302]
shaving the beard with lemon, are condemned by the Kurds
alternatively as Shiite or Iranian. Curiously, they
despise alliteration, in the Middle East purely Arabic and [304]
ingrown, as Farsi, "Persian," despite the fact that the
practice seems to have no record in that country. One
might suppose, particularly in view of the growth of pan-
Islamic movements in recent years, that this distinction
between Sunnite and Shiite was falling into decay. At a
gathering in Rowanduz the investigator, on being informed
by an army officer that he came from the southern provinces,
innocently inquired if he belonged to the Shi'ah. When the
officer replied curiously in the affirmative, there was a
burst of laughter and derision from his fellow officers and
officials, a matter of no little embarrassment. Even on [582]
the highest levels of society, there are few marriages be-
tween Sunnite and Shiite families.

The third division is on ethnic or national lines, 563
which, aside from foreigners and non-Muslims, separates

Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, and Turks. There are Persian 563
minorities in the cities of central and southern Iraq, but they fall under the religious classification of Shi'ah and there seems to be no conflict between them and Arabs of their own persuasion. The Turks are few in number and are concentrated in the middle and upper classes. In the days before the liberation of Iraq, there was bitter enmity toward the Turks as the representatives of Ottoman rule, but this has disappeared in recent years and there is no restriction, as, indeed, there never was, on marriage be- [582]
tween members of this class and Sunnite Muslims, Arabs and Kurds, of comparable status. A survey of the lists of officials and army officers reveals the remarkable extent to which the survivors of Ottoman rule have retained their position in the government service. The Turkomans are gathered in central and northeastern Iraq, mainly about Altun Kheupri and Kal Sanjaq, and have been unspectacular in national affairs, largely farmers and shepherds, a remnant of the famous Horde of the White Sheep. Again, [582]
there appears to be no restriction on marriage with Sunnite Muslims, but there is little reason for an Arab, Kurd, or Turk of the upper classes to take an illiterate, impoverished bride from among them.

The matter of Arab and Kurd is quite otherwise, for 186
in the case of the latter there is a well-armed minority 649
population, Muslims, and hence free of the susceptibilities 181
of religious attack, with a strong base in agriculture and animal husbandry. They are estimated at 400,000 persons,

and representatives of the same nation, totalling several millions, are held by in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. There is some cause for apprehension as there have been no less than six armed Kurdish rebellions, some common to several of the four governments involved and quelled with difficulty, in the past twenty-five years. As in the case of most of the population, the royal family of Iraq is Arab and the language of government is Arabic. The spectre of Kurdish nationalism strikes terror in the hearts of government officials, and there is little love lost between Arab and Kurd. Many of the Kurds regard the Arabs as unlawful rulers, at the same time scorning them for the poverty and filth to be found in southern Iraq. "Are you an Arab?" a Kurdish man or woman often challenges a dirty child of the village, "Go wash yourself." On their part, the Arabs, particularly those of the upper classes, following the tradition of Ibnsphon, regard the Kurds with a mixture of fear and disgust. "Why do you waste your time with those people?" the investigator was asked by an Arab official, "they are all bandits." In spite of these things, there is no bar to intermarriage between the two groups, and any Kurd can rise to great prominence in the government service, although he is a priori under suspicion. In 1951 two of the fourteen provinces in Iraq were directed by Kurdish governors, and the command of the army unit at Sulaimaniya was for a time given to a Kurdish staff officer.

In addition, there is a certain amount of rivalry between persons of different provinces or cities, for

example, an Arab of Mosul and one of Baghdad, but it does not appear to be of a serious nature. Among the Kurds, one can often hear the native of a certain locale praising it to the exclusion of others. "The preparation of rice at Sulaymaniya is the best," a Kurd of this city proclaims in a discussion of cookery, but feelings of this type do not operate to separate the people in any important way, because religious and ethnic divisions have much greater weight. On the other hand, tribal allegiance in certain rural areas has great importance, although increased government control in matters such as the vendetta has mitigated their character to some extent. It is difficult to formulate any general rules for tribal exogamy or endogamy, because the chieftains often intermarry with aristocratic houses of the same standing, regardless of tribe. The tendency among most tribesmen, Kurd or Arab, is toward marriage within their own group, because the preferential match is between cousins.

In the other divisions of society, two parallel systems, at many points intermingled, are to be found. In the first of these there is a simple division between a hereditary aristocracy and a mass of commoners and this system is primitive or quasi-primitive. Save for Kurdistan and certain areas held by groups such as the Chaldeans, the Mandeans, or the Yezidis, much of Iraq has been partitioned for centuries among Arab tribes. The chieftains of these tribes and their subdivisions are aristocrats who inherit their position in the paternal

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peasant, by dint of education and enterprise, may rise to the highest ministry in the state. However, those families already in the upper classes, through wealth and influence, tend to retain their hold. As far as inter-marriage is concerned, mates are sought who are equal to or higher in status than the person in question. It has been said that there is only one definite cleavage, but there is also a very fine sense of equality in terms of relative wealth and rank. It is possible for a man of the upper class of this system to marry into the hereditary aristocracy, and for a chieftain to take a wife from among the daughters of some official or officer, but, insofar as the aristocratic rank is patrilineal, there is no danger to the proud lineages in question. On the whole, there seems to be far less stringency in matters of marriage in this system than in the first. A successful lawyer, for example, a peasant by birth, might marry the daughter of a minister, but the daughter of a chieftain can never wed a successful peasant.

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It would be incorrect to assign the Muslim clergy, the mullas of the Sunnites and the imams of the Shiites, to any particular horizon in the two systems, for they are to be found in almost all classes of society. They are literate, of course, inasmuch as it is necessary to be able to read the Quran, but there is some suspicion that a few have acquired chapter and verse by ear alone, without fully understanding the art of reading. An amusing

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[522]

story, widespread in the Middle East, tells of one such illiterate approached by a peasant woman with a letter, apparently betaying news of her husband on the pilgrimage to Mecca. "Should I rejoice or weep?" she anxiously inquired of the mulla who was studying the document intently. "Weep," he answered after a short time, and the woman tore her garments and went into mourning, assuming her spouse to have died in the course of his pious errand. Actually, however, the letter announced the safe arrival of the man in question, a message ordinarily causing the greatest rejoicing and the preparation of a feast of welcome. When the pilgrim returned, he was dismayed to find his house closed in mourning, and asked the neighbors who gathered in great excitement about him the identity of the deceased. "God is greatest! you are dead, Hajji," they replied. The matter was speedily explained by discussion, and the whole party sought of the mulla some reason for his peculiar reaction. "If I told the wife to rejoice," returned the latter, "in the arrogance of her demonstrations of joy she might have tempted the Lord to destroy her husband," and all were satisfied with these words. There are both poor and wealthy mullas, and they are able to marry according to their status in this sense. The servish, as a religious functionary, is always a man of the lowest class, but, as was learned in esoteric lore, even persons of the highest status are initiated into the mysteries of the servish order. In Rwanda one could find a servish in a dominated

In contrast to the government, treating such affairs more 632
as sport rather than anything else. Sayyid Ahmad sub- 648
sequently recounted with some pleasure his experiences in exile, for he did not spend months at the time. He heard the official in charge of him, for example, called "stupid" until his book by substitution, and concluded that this was his name, always addressing the unfortunate officer as "Stupid Beg" until he was finally corrected. In order [522]
to designate the type of seat he desired for his mule, he was forced to refer to intentions of the animals in question, and thought his own picture, that of a Kurdish aristocrat, a son of the great Shaykh Taha, flopping his arms and crowing to a bewildered Arab orderly, most amusing.

Toward the townspeople, the chief's are much more 632
friendly, calling them by name and spending long hours 645
talking with those of higher status, such as wealthy merchants. They are not fond of either the shopkeepers or the women, although one occasionally finds them there. Insofar [507]
as they do not marry within their own families, they prefer the neighbors of the wealthy merchants and landowners of the town, for these are supposed to be more "refined," and hence to have greater prestige, than any village maiden. The daughter of Sa'ad Effendi, for example, is married to an aristocrat from elsewhere in the district, while Sadik Agha (the first mule here used as a proper name). Among 565
themselves, there is extensive community of interest and 632
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townspeople themselves, or to the government personnel, although most of its details are commonplace. Marriages between aristocratic houses often follow these alignments, although now and then a wedding is arranged which will join two houses not normally friendly toward each other. A chieftain with a number of daughters and sufficient wealth and prestige to attract suitors can build up quite a system of allies, thus increasing his own power, and the same can be done with a number of sons.

Turning to the townspeople, who in the first system constitute the mass of commoners, a rather confused social hierarchy is revealed. Several concepts are responsible for this, the first of which is that it is considered decending for men of the "upper" class to work with their hands. The group of persons who are not so tainted, in addition to the aristocracy, officials, and officers, thus includes among the people of the town the clerks, landowners, *mulisi* or priests, and businessmen, such as the wealthier merchants and the owners of the *shaibhouse* and the hotel. Such a person is termed *effendi* or "gentleman," and occupies the highest ranks of the commoner group. Two examples are provided by *shaikh* Effendi and Sa'id Effendi, both landowners. In addition to their properties, *Shaikh* Effendi is the clerk of the judge's court and Sa'id Effendi is the *mulisi* or representative of the townspeople. The chief *mulisi* of the town is addressed as "Malim 'Abd-al-Karim Effendi." Literacy, a distinctive requirement of the

upper class in the second system, is unnecessary for this group. Ra'uf Effendi, for example, cannot read or write, although he can sign his name and speaks four languages fluently. It is with these "genteel" commoners that there is intermarriage among the aristocracy, although commoners can never obtain the rank of a chieftain. The basis of the class are either wealth or literacy. A mullā can be extremely poor and still enjoy the distinction. It might be mentioned that the lowest class of civil servants, the clerks, as well as Christians and Jews, if wealthy, are addressed by the same term elsewhere in Iraq. A teacher, however, does not always like to be called effendi because he has had a college or university education, and, no matter how poorly paid, belongs to the educated upper class of the second system.

Rowanduz is non-tribal and does not, as a whole, owe allegiance to any particular chieftain, although the house of Isma'il Beg owns a great part of the town. "We do not belong to tribes," Ra'uf Effendi explained, "although perhaps our ancestors did, but we have an knowledge of them." Peasants of the lower classes, translants or migrants from the villages, may, of course, retain such affiliations. In Ottoman times, Rowanduz enjoyed an independence, just as it does today, from tribal or feudal obligations. The wealthy merchants of the town, particularly those engaged in the lucrative caravan trade with Iran, were called zīnātlīs, another Turkish term for "gentlemen."

outline until further investigation is able to furnish a more complete account. Here is the lowest element of society, mature women, those of the officials and officers, the aristocrats, and the wealthier townsmen, are generally restricted to the interior of their houses, and move out freely with society at large. It is more or less inevitable that such women have their friends and visitors among the female relatives of their fathers' and husbands' families, for only these can visit each other's houses without restriction. Because marriages are arranged between persons on a basis of supposedly status, a woman's friends, like those of her husband, are close to her in rank. However, women of the upper classes are much more cosmopolite in most respects in their demeanor toward inferiors of the same sex than their husbands are toward similar, and spend long hours in intimate conversation with female servants, concubines and countrymen. The latter are, in fact, an important link with the outside world of the town, inasmuch as they are able to intermingle with others of the lower classes and hence provide the mistress of a wealthy household with welcome news and gossip. The life of the wives of the officials and officers is much more difficult, because their friends and relatives have been left elsewhere in Iraq, and there is almost an excuse of feeling any responsibilities in the town. They, too, find pleasure in the consumption of their wages, such as food, and, with the knowledge of the husbands concerned, may visit

The mâl, as a group of kindred, is thus a field patrilineal unit which can range from a single couple and their children to a much more numerous ensemble. It only includes male maternal relatives in cases of exceptional emergency. A man who finds himself without paternal relatives and left destitute for some reason may seek temporary shelter with his sister's husband. Similarly, a widow whose deceased husband's relatives cannot care for her and her children normally applies to her father or brother. Only in cases such as these are males belonging to another mâl to be found in the household. The mâl is not strictly a named group, although one can, for example, speak of the "Mâl Shaikr Ittwaki," referring, on one hand, to his house, and, on the other, to his family. The Kurds do not use family names, and, because of the immediate result of most marriages in forming new units, commoners rarely keep track of collateral relatives beyond the degree of first cousin or trace the direct patrilineal line more than one or two generations. The point of reference is usually one's father or one's son. One of the sons of Shaikr Ittwaki is formally termed Asla Shaikr Hajjrin [the last is a nickname of his father], and the same person is conventionally called "Asla Hamad," the father of Hamad, from the name of his son, the second practice exactly like that of the Arabs. The mâl can be endogamous or exogamous. The preferred match is between the children of two brothers, and, if both occupy the same house, marriage is thus within the mâl-group. Otherwise, many marriages are arranged between

agreed with them and went beyond them in the estimation of her worth, only the sale of all my family's property could realise their demand. One of them was kind enough to take me aside and to explain that there was a substantial difference between the documentary amount, published to the townspeople, and that which must actually be paid." It is perhaps for this reason that the mention, the amount "paid" at the time of the wedding, is a much larger proportion of the dowry than the mu'ikhir, that which must be forthcoming in divorce, the former representing in part the social fiction and the latter a more realistic economic appraisal. Nevertheless, the dowry functions strongly as an argument against hostile repudiations, and few men, having invested a substantial part of their own or their relatives' capital in a match, will undertake divorce lightly. As recorded above, many persons use the usual monetary gains to give their wives jewelry of precious metal, a matter of pleasure for the lady and, at the same time, further insurance against divorce or financial catastrophe.

To approach the Kurdish kinship system, it is necessary to deal with certain other aspects of marriage, the first of which is incest. Unlawful intercourse or marriage between certain relatives is also governed by the religious law of Islam, and one cannot with confidence advance anything from contemporary Kurdish society which will provide a functional or final explanation of the specific determinants of these proscriptions. There is

no reason to believe, however, that such early prohibitions differed too greatly from those formulated by the Prophet. Specifically, it is forbidden for persons to marry their grandparents, parents, the brothers and sisters of their parents, and their own brothers and sisters. Further, noting that polygyny is permitted, a man is prohibited from having two sisters as his wives. Only if one sister dies, is he permitted to wed the survivor. Finally, an infant whose mother cannot feed him is often given to a wet-nurse, and this person, no matter what her status (in Rwanda she is typically a villager) becomes his "mother." In later life he is under the same restrictions toward her and her kindred as he is toward his own mother, for example, he can never marry her daughter. The townspeople of Rwanda provided rationalizations for some of these matters, and they are embedded here with little comment. The rule that a man could not be married to two sisters simultaneously was explained by the adage that a husband habitually addressed his parents-in-law as "father" and "mother," his brother-in-law as "brother," and his sister-in-law as "sister," although, as will be seen, there are also separate terms for relatives by marriage. A man cannot take the sister of his wife as a second wife, it was said, because it was as if she were his real "sister," as he called her. In Rwandese descent is commonly discussed in two ways, through the blood (*ibyo*) of the parents and through the milk (*amata*) of the mother. Great

importance is attached to marrying, and the ultimate curse of a mother toward her offspring, the worst of events, is the wish that her "milk should never have been a misfortune in his mouth." It is forbidden for children who have been nursed at the same breast to marry and for this reason a youth can never wed his foster-sister, the daughter of his wet-nurse. It must be noted that in selecting a wet nurse, one with whose daughter an endogamous marriage might be subsequently arranged is never sought, but rather some woman of the lower classes or of the village. Neither of these explanations, nor a third, that of descent through "blood," can be expanded to explain the prohibition of marriage between two generations. To amplify this statement, one cannot marry his sister "because they have been nursed at the same breast," but the rationale does not apply to an aunt who is similarly forbidden.

Islamic law permits a man to take four wives if he so chooses. This, however, in its full realization presents many more obstacles than are immediately apparent. First, he must pay separate dowries for each spouse, and the dowry, as has been seen, as well as the feeding, clothing, and maintenance, of a single wife is not an inexpensive undertaking. Polygyny, then, is more often than not the prerogative of the extremely wealthy. At the same time, the threat to connubial happiness in maintaining two or more wives under the same roof is vitally recognized in the Middle East, and there are many examples, in literature and in popular speech, of the intense jealousy developed in such a situation

a situation. The tendency is for most persons to remain [595]
monogamous, and the usual reason for taking a second wife
is the failure of the first to produce a male heir when, [891]
at the same time, the husband is loathe to divorce the
barren woman in question. Re'af Rifondi was "ridiculed" of
marrying a second wife who could replace the son he had
lost, because the woman to whom he had been married for
many years had passed the stage of child-bearing. He has
not, however, carried out this intention yet. Sometimes a
wife herself will suggest suggest the second marriage. In
Rwanda, in 1951, there were no men with a plurality of
brides. It was said that some of the chiefs/sub in olden
times had been able to maintain a number of wives in
separate establishments, but most of this seems to have
disappeared.

The preferred form of marriage is that between a [582]
man and his father's brother's daughter. If the father
and the uncle live under the same roof, it may be seen that
such a match prevents the money from being paid into a
strange pot, and in marriages of this type the stipulated
sum of the money is often highly fictional. In Ruritania
a man always has the first claim on his paternal uncle's
daughter, and his consent must first be obtained if she
is to marry someone else. A bitter feud can ensue if the [576]
parents of the maiden, in view of some advantageous alliance,
override this prerogative. If an idealized situation is
imagined in which the prescriptions that a man must marry

his father's brother's daughter is held as an inexorable rule, it can be seen that marriages must be arranged between pairs of brothers and sisters who are cousins to each other. Thus, one's father and father's brother are married to his mother and mother's sister respectively, and the mother's brothers and father's sisters make up third and fourth cousins. If two things are envisaged, patrilineal residence and Islamic inheritance, it can be appreciated in the first regard that both the paternal and maternal aunts are parties to an individual's residence, the first, the wife of the mother's brother, before she is married, and the second, the wife of the father's brother, after her wedding. Both paternal and maternal aunts are denoted by the same kinship term, ʿamm. On the other hand, the paternal and maternal uncles are differentiated, called ʿamm and khāl respectively. The first lives under the paternal roof of the individual concerned, and the latter marries this uncle's daughter. The maternal uncle, as has been seen, rarely, if ever, lives in the same house as his married sister, and in the system imagined here, one cannot marry his daughter. As far as inheritance is concerned, it has been noted that the property is divided, each son receiving a share and each daughter a half-share. If there are offspring, a man cannot claim any part of the estate of his maternal uncles or aunts. If, however, he is married to the daughter of a paternal uncle, his wife receives a half-share of her father's property, just as his sister, and to the son of the paternal uncle, is given a

half-share of the holdings of his father. Such a system is immediately divergent, because, although there is an exchange of marriages between cousins in one's own generation, the strains divide in the next. A man's children must intermarry with those of his brother, and would not, for example, espouse those of his cousins. The larger proportion of the property, the full male shares, follow the same divergent lines.

Such an idealized system, however, does not seem to exist. A man is permitted to marry any of his other cousins, the daughters of his paternal aunt, maternal uncle, or maternal aunt, or, as often happens, can take a wife completely unrelated to him. In Rwanda, unlike certain other groups reported in the Middle East, there does not appear to be any hierarchy of preference among the cousins after the daughter of the father's brother. It was not possible to compile a list of marriages extensive enough to permit definitive comment on the relative frequency of these five types of marriage. Nevertheless, from examples, there appeared to be a high percentage of matches between unrelated persons. Coupled with this was the inability of most persons in the area to name their relatives beyond their grandparents, uncles and aunts, first cousins, and immediate family. This group, incidentally, corresponds closely with that outlined as making up the mû or "house" in its most extensive sense. In addition, they were able to name the parents, some of the uncles, aunts, brothers, and sisters of their wives. A sentencing of the in-laws of

their own brothers and sisters was known. The impression 582
the investigator obtained from all of these things was that 536
the patrilineage, expressed in the gai or "house," strongly
overrode the lateral extension of relations to extend or
broaden the kinship group. Marriages undertaken for 581
economic or social advantage add to the divergency, inas-
much as they bring together at one point unrelated groups.
It must be remembered, however, that Rwanda was re-
settled from various sources after its destruction in the
first World War, and the marriages of its families, many
of them migrants to the town, cannot be expected to show
the characteristics of a similar community whose popula-
tion had been left undisturbed. In the agricultural 421
villages of the district, it was said, somewhat arithmetic. 402
that "everyone is related," but one suspects, in view of the 571
importance of the patrilineage and the form of inheritance,
that even in these places marriages characteristically
cause divergence in forming new family or sub-groups, and
the village population is constantly regrouping, rather
than constituting a systematically interrelated whole.

The Kurdish kinship nomenclature, as recorded at 601
Amedieh, makes systematic use of a limited number of
basic terms. The first group of these, twelve in number,
indicate consanguineal relationships, those held to be
by the "milk" of the mother or by the "blood."

1. [illegible]	["Milk Father"]	[illegible]
2. [illegible]	["Milk Mother"]	[illegible]
3. [illegible]	["Father"]	Father
4. [illegible]	["Mother"]	Mother

[Text continues on page 237]

[illegible] ...ceremonial ties for bringing together any group larger than the village, and no ...ceremonial relations of a ceremonial or ritual nature have been developed.

The organizational form is consistent with a strong emphasis on the father's brother's daughter as preferred spouse, and marked tendency to close family endogamy. The strength of emphasis is indicated by (1) expressed norms, (2) effective limitations, and (3) actual statistical occurrence.

(1) Informants agree that parental consent have first rights on a girl, and that where the father of a girl contemplates giving her in marriage to anyone else, the parental consent must first release her by consenting his choice. Cases of violence resulting from breach of this obligation on the part of the father were collected in the field and have been recorded by others in the literature.[1] Giving one's daughter to a brother's son is further considered thoughtful and proper: the father knows his daughter's spouse well, and will also be able to exert some control over his actions toward her after marriage; marriage should be between equals, and no one is closer in status and sentiments than a parental cousin. Small children are ceremonially endowed when named for being "in love" with their parental cousin. The importance of endogamy in maintaining family property is also recognized, though the problem only arises with any degree of gravity where [illegible] male lines of inheritance, giving exceptional functions of the estate to female descendants, are strictly followed, and this does not generally seem to be the case.

(2) It is an agreed privilege for parental cousins, or less usually the other members, to receive the girl as a reduced bridewise. The normal bridewise for village [illegible] girls ranges between Rs5-10. Parental cousins generally pay only wedding expenses.

(3) The actual frequency of father's brother's daughter and other cousin marriage is high, apparently ranging around fifty percent. The degree of relationship between all living spouses in two normal and Homestead villages fall into the following categories:

Husband's Wife						
FaBrDa (cousin)	MoBrDa (Relative)	BiDa (cousin)	Other relative	Unrelated, in village	Other village	Total
9	1	2	7	3	9	31

Taking the normal frequencies in the end on distribution of sibling group size sizes, the probability approximates the statistical frequency that marriage with actual, non-distributory parental cousin are reasonably exists.

1. See W. H. Rivers, The Toda of Southern India (London, 1906), p. 51.

When the son of marrying an unrelated, "foreign" girl is so high and the economic gratification he can use him down, the inducement for the young man to seek a bride among his cousins is evident. Consequently, the young men under the "right" choice though they appear subjectively as free, and formally espouse the opinion, that they are entirely free to seek any bride they might wish. The problem in the situation centers around what the acquisition of the girl's father is, that he should forego his right to a bridegroom which, in the Kurdish system, can amount to many hundreds. Or put somewhat differently, the central problem to what can the advantages gained in this system by giving one's daughter as a bride's own which compensate one for the loss of the bridegroom.

The answer would seem to lie in the political structure. In the Kurdish foreign system, all groups are subject to a constant pressure towards segmentation and fission, accentuated by the fundamental circles of identification normally associated with segmentary descent systems (among the Tiyari, territorial vs. descent groups, cross-cutting segmentation among Talbani, further the usual subdivisions between foreigners, etc.). The pressure is particularly evident in factional activity within the villages, and emerges in all functional descriptions of Kurdish life.[1] Kurdish villages are characterized by a constant struggle for political power on the part of a majority of the adult men, or their core women. Such political power is proportional to the number of alliances one can mobilize to support one's claims. In a patrilineal foreign system, a man can expect political support only from his agnatic relatives, those who by descent belong to his political sub-section, and the fraction in the village and in the alignments of the younger men of a small foreign segment around an elder leader. These segments consist primarily of brothers, sons, and brothers' sons. The relation to the latter is most critical. It creates the first generation of descent-group internal alliances. If a man alienates his nephews by refusing them their traditional rights, he loses their political support. If he, on the other hand, gives them his daughters in marriage, the ties are reinforced and foreign solidarity maintained. The girl's father creates an obligation on the part of the bridegroom's son to give him political support by accepting him into passing the bridegroom. His other wife-takers are, in the foreign system, his political supporters, consequently they must immediately pay bridegroom. The connection may thus be regarded as constituting a type of delayed exchange: the father receives political allegiance in the relation from his brother's son in return for the daughter which he gives him. In this way, the payment of patrimonial father's brother's

[1] See C. J. Bell, Peasants of Arabistan (London, 1955), E. A. Ross, Tribal Movements and Tribalism in Persian Kurdistan, 1941). This is an illustration of how marriage customs can be analyzed in the part of social organization of the foreign system.

[illegible]

daughter marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system.

If the view is generally correct, one would expect to find a high frequency of Kabul's brothers' daughter marriage associated with a developed lineage organization in the Middle East, and the frequencies to be appreciably lower in villages with a different type of organization. In the northern Kurdish area, this is clearly not the case; the literature gives no conclusive evidence.

In the northern Kurdish tribally organized territory, neighboring on the above discussed Nestorian territory, the comparative picture might be summarized as follows: (1) The segmental system was modified, though not drastically changed. Here rights of parental control are not as strongly emphasized, and the kind of equality between spouses which is so conspicuous in terms of village endogamy rather does with reference to descent groups. (2) Endogamy used to be lower for all categories of husbands, especially those of the local community (the fields were for the villagers, not for the larger tribe, where great variations in clan and wealth interests) some villages have made formal agreements that an endogamy should be changed within the village unit, the alternative and undesirable possible way of arranging bridegroom is the more exchange between two indifferently related men. (3) The actual frequency of Kabul's brother's daughter marriage clearly drops, while village endogamy (in villages generally larger than those with a low age organization) remains high. A complete census of marriages in one such non-tribal village may serve as an example:

Husband's father (deceased)	Husband's father (living)	Wife (sister)	Other relatives	Unrelated, in village	Other village	Total
0	1	1	9	17	10	40

The above would seem to be consistent with the views expressed above.

Hilma Granqvist[1] gives some comparable material from an Arab village in Palestine, where the local community is divided into patrilineal descent groups, called clans, apparently of a segmentary type, but where several of these descent groups reside together in a large village, and have no other political or territorial importance. She offers the following frequencies of degree of relationship between spouses in one village:[2]

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1) Hilma Granqvist, Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village (Helsingfors, 1931).
2) Ibid., pp. 41, 42, 104-105.

Subclan	Total marriages within clans	Between combined co-villagers	With strangers	Total
20 10.3%	80 41.2%	52 27%	111 42.8%	260

There is some suggestion that clan endogamy has similar functional implications in this situation as lineage exogamy has in the Kachin system, but that the emphasis centers on the opposition between co-villein clans—whereas the discrepancy between 20 percent marriages within own clan vs. 20 percent with own local co-villagers, in a village where there major and the smaller clans co-reside. The Crawfords profess the standard explanation: " . . . marriage with the father's daughter's son is preferred to any other marriage in order to prevent a stranger who might claim part of the property and inheritance of the family."[1] This runs through her ingenuity a further weakness in the fact that her villagers do not observe the proper Kachin rule[2] of giving both male and female relatives of the same degree a share of inheritance, in the proportion 2:1— " . . . even if it be seldom that a man die without having any sons, yet the possibility allows it as far as to allow marriage between the children of brothers to appear specially desirable."[3]

Chapple and Coon offer a theoretical analysis of parallel cousin marriage, with special reference to the Bedouin[4] which, if I have understood their argument correctly, emphasizes the incompatibility of a subordinate son-in-law relation to a non-relative with a system of strong political and economic identification with the lineage segment—in this case sons as component of father, son, and father's brother. This incompatibility is then resolved by a process of establishing the son-in-law as kinsman with the father's brother, through marriage with a father's brother's daughter. This appears as a rather round-about way of avoiding the problem from the point of view developed here, but their discussion indicates that the processes are not inapplicable to the marriage patterns among the Bedouin.

The pattern of view expressed above might be summarized briefly. As contrasted to most African systems, marriage patterns among the Muslim peoples of the Middle East are liberated from their role in expressing the relations between segments of a larger lineage system. The potential autonomy of these patterns is an vital structural way that theoretically be utilized in various ways.

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(1) Idem, p. 76, where further references to the text are given.
(2) A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1952), p. 50.
(3) Crawford, op. cit., p. 76.
(4) E. D. Chapple and C. S. Coon, Principles of Anthropology (New York, 1942), pp. 539-540.

3: Harvard E-5 (1951) 1954 MAIL Hard MAIL

[illegible]

In many areas of the Middle East, a pattern of close family endogamy and preferential father's brother's daughter marriage has been assumed to be associated with a desire to maximize family property in the face of Koranic rules of inheritance. The apparently exceptionally high frequency of father's brother's daughter marriage among the Kurdish tribes with foreign organizations, and possibly among other groups with a similar organization, requires separate explanation. The basis of this above discussion has been that such a pattern of father's brother's daughter marriage plays a prominent role in solidifying the minimal lineage as a corporate group in political struggle. Marriages of this type thus serve to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system, and, in most African systems, adhere to the relations between whole lineages, but have, on the contrary, relations to the less primordial lines of fission and segmentation within the individual lineage itself.

[illegible]
[illegible]

schoolhood that will provide that deep contentment of mind, the harmony of mind, that I came across in the village women who could neither read nor write?

The boys, even as small as 6–7 years of age, led in Sakalawadi what we should call a street life. Playgrounds were unknown, corresponding to the fact that the attitude there was not that childhood should be passed in play. To give street life its due, it must be remembered that the men, as a rule, live in the street, while the women and small children occupy the home. As work and as leisure boys and men spend their time outside the home. In consequence the boys obtained a street education among men, and we must return to ancient Greece to discover a parallel[9] showing the positive and negative aspects of this form of education.

The Coran, Sura 4, verse 1, says: "Be mindful of your duty towards Allah ..., and towards the wombs [that bore you]". This command is honoured to a high degree on the part of a son. To illustrate the intimate relations between mother and son, I once saw a young Kurd climbing up the steep hill to the small hospital at the Dohuk Dam Site with his sick mother on his back, apparently a more comfortable mode of transport for her than a donkey or a mule[10].

MARRIAGE

The limitations in the choice of spouse are found in the Coran[11]. A man cannot marry his own mother (or other of his father's wives), his daughter or granddaughter, his mother's sister, his father's sister, his sister, his brother's daughter, his mother-in-law or step-daughter. But, in addition, a non-incestuous relationship exists not only between blood relations and intermarried persons but also in respect of milk kinship, which is put on a par with blood relationship. As the law at the same time recommends that a spouse be sought within the family, marriage possibilities are complex and several cousins, that is the descendants of uncles, aunts, grand uncles and grand aunts[12]. Of these marriage possibilities the cousin on the father's side is preferable and then the cousin on the mother's side. The terms in the Kurdish kinship system, purely descriptive indicating the genealogical distance between close relations[13], are: father's brother's daughter, amikal, (ortho-cousin marriage); father's sister's daughter, pâmâl, (cross-cousin marriage); mother's brother's daughter, xalikal, (cross-cousin marriage); and mother's sister's daughter, pâmâl, (ortho-cousin marriage).

In the towns I stayed in I met in the village upper class the father's brother's daughter wedding which, according to Lewis[14] and Barth[15] is that preferred by Kurds. In the dwâlik family in Tiqsarra the wife was the daughter of the father's brother in Sergalu. In Sarkan two of the dwâlik's three married sons were married to two sisters, both daughters of the father's brother. According to Lewis the marriage of village leaders "used to have political influence" like the "Royal marriages of medieval Europe"[16]. In my experience this was not so, for the sister I met was the father's brother's daughter whether or common in Kurd society.

It was stated that two families could exchange daughters. Both my interpreter and Shaikh Taffer's brother said that if the desired bride had an elder brother, a bride for him is demanded from the bridegroom's family. When asked, the 15 year old son of the Shaikh of Tiqsarra said further that a man in his village was able to marry anyone he wished. However, I do not think that one could take

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

can be attached to what this young man said, so I prefer to stick to the facts available about his immediate family. In the humble village environment (Topzawa) I came across three examples of brides having been brought from Sulaimani as they gave prestige to the village. In the educated milieu, on the other hand, I met a strongly-expressed wish to be linked by marriage with good, prominent families.

Difference in the position of man and woman when contracting marriage. None of the brides in Kurdistan whom I had an opportunity to observe appeared as radiant as we are accustomed to see in our culture. The Kurdish brides either looked remarkably unaffected or else directly mournful. My interpreter's sister, whose wedding preparations and later wedding I witnessed, went about in the days prior to the wedding extremely unkempt and with an attitude of complete indifference. In reply to my question my interpreter told me that it is not the custom for brides to take any part in the preparations, and that out of regard for her future family no impression must be given of exploiting the working capacity of the young woman; in addition, the bride-to-be must not suggest, by paying too much attention to her appearance, that she is interested in being married.

In her study of weddings and marriages in Palestine, Granqvist probably provides an explanation applicable also to the Kurds, for she says[2] that it is the bridegroom who is happy, and with him his family and friends. Happiness prevails in the house of the bridegroom, the house of the wedding. A bride, on the other hand must bewail her fate. Is she not to leave her family home, and will not this home lose a member? Besides, Granqvist points out, it is considered highly unbecoming for a bride to evince happiness.

When, on the other hand, the marriage negotiations began in the case of my interpreter's brother and the wedding arrangements were being discussed, it was planned as a joyous festival, the house next door being borrowed and a dance arranged in its large courtyard. A later letter, dated 23rd August 1938, told me that 600 people were invited to the wedding, and that the dance had lasted from morning to night. As an unmarried son, his accommodation in the home was confined to a mattress which he spread out with the rest of the family, plus a niche behind a mirror for his few effects: his pyjamas (shirt and sleeping garment) lay, when not in use, rolled up on a chair in the guest reception room, which he also used for changing. In a word, he had had only a minimum of room at his disposal. When he married he and his wife would be allotted to their sole use one of the house's three living rooms. He and his wife, at all events initially, would form a cell within the family with a claim to space and a private life—a notable improvement of his position in the home.

Marriage policy and marriage negotiations. "Many families have wanted me", was my interpreter's reply to my question as to what possibilities she had had to be married. In other words she could boast of the fact that many families had applied to her[3] regarding the instigation of the marriage negotiations set essential a preliminary to a marriage in a Muslim area, where the world of men and women is divided, and a young man meets no women other than his nearest relations with whom marriage is precluded.

In the family home of my interpreter at Sulaimani I had an opportunity of watching at close quarters the marriage negotiations conducted by the young man's family with that of a possible candidate.

584 Gently select the prospective bride, also when the first choice is dropped, as mentioned above. It is
369 the women who conduct the preliminary negotiations[1], which are concluded by a meeting between the men of the two families implicated.

[591] The girl can refuse to agree to the union, but this, I was told, is regarded as a great insult. According to the law the father and grandfather have an unlimited right to marry off a minor daughter or granddaughter without obtaining her permission[2].

562 In the meantime a Kurdish girl can oppose the concept of marriage itself. My interpreter, an
584 extremely intelligent girl, hoped to be able to continue her education abroad, a thing the city authorities perceived to be a possibility, and therefore did not wish to marry for the time being. I did not come across any example of a father or mother forcing a daughter into marriage. There was, on the other hand, a case where a father had forced a young son to marry a girl fifteen years older. To avoid this forced marriage the young man fled to the mountains, but in vain. The father got his way. While in Kurdistan I met the woman in question and the fruits of the marriage, a little girl; the husband I only saw at a distance.

● 582 In regard to the age at which marriage is contracted, there is the case of my interpreter's half-sister, who became a bride at the age of twelve. Asked if she could consider being married, she remained silent[3]. I was told that she had been big and strong for her age. Her two children had been born when she was 16 and 18, and she and they looked quite healthy and sound. In Halabja I lived in a home where the then 23 year old wife had been married at the age of 11, her husband then having been 23[4]. Her first child was born 6-7 years after the marriage. It was said that in the districts around

[221] Tawella, to which many families moved just for most of the summer on account of the work in the mulberry plantations there, and adolescent boys and girls picked fruit together, they, failing the protection afforded to their virginity by a home, it was common for girls to be married before reaching puberty. In Balkha brides of 11-12 were mentioned. Here the reason for the early entry into the married state was said to be the shortage of adult women, but it was also averred that the first child was not born for 6-7 years after the wedding. Maternity before the girl is full-grown, as met with in India, does not therefore, appear to be usual in Southern Kurdistan.

It might be expected that a girl of 11 or 12 would as a housewife be little use to a man, but my interpreter told me that a girl of this age—to us but a child—although completely uneducated and illiterate, was on the other hand domestically accomplished and fully aware of the behaviour required of her as her new home. In consequence no major difficulties existed. As a parallel to this we have what Kaberry[5] says about the conditions of the Australian aborigines. Here a child bride of 9-11 is fully

[191] trained in the pattern of behaviour required of her, has some sexual knowledge, is prepared for her orderly duties, and therefore cannot in any way be compared with a European schoolgirl of a similar age.

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585 *The marriage contract.* A church or civil wedding is the main feature of a marriage contracted in the West, and conditions in the event of divorce, death of the spouse, and the wife's economic position during marriage are not laid down at that time. The drawing up of a marriage settlement and separate estate are still not regarded as really good form, and, despite the large percentage, divorce is not taken into consideration. Questions of inheritance are also arranged later, if at all.

ceremony make her his wife again within the above-mentioned period[586]. Should he have pronounced *talāq* three times or have raped a virgin on the first occasion, the wife must contract a pro forma marriage with another man and must be consummated by this "quasi husband" before the husband can take her back[587]. The Quran forbids the practice of abstinence, or if you will, a semi-divorce within marriage, that is to say, that the husband declares: "Let thy back be to me as my mother's", known as *zihār* (*zahr* = back)[588]. In this case the wife will not obtain the right to return to her family bestowing everything she brought into the marriage, plus what she may herself have earned and that part of the bride price (usually one third) that has been put aside for such a contingency, and with a view to facilitating a new marriage.

On her side the wife has the following possibilities of severing the dissolution of the marriage. The marriage contract can contain a clause to the effect that neglect on the part of the husband gives the wife the right to regard the marriage as dissolved, by repaying the bride price, if she can prove before a judge that the man does not fulfil his obligations in regard to maintaining her in accordance with her station, in cases of certain illnesses or if it should transpire that he is of poorer birth than stated.

On contracting marriage the husband undertakes to provide for the wife; she in return engages to present him with children, which means that the children born belong to the man's home. If the marriage is dissolved while the children are small, the wife takes with her male children under two years of age[589], girls under nine (or up to puberty), whereafter they return to the husband's home. On marriage, therefore, the woman runs the risk of being consumed (amongst being made to redeem this by the fixing of a high bride price, and particularly by making as high as possible that part of it set aside for possible later payment), she also runs the risk of sharing the man with another wife or more. The husband runs a risk that the wife the women of his family have selected for him, whom in most cases he has never seen, is impossible to live with. To meet this contingency he has the immediate right to divorce her and also the right to take other wives.

Having briefly recounted the ordinary rules of Islam within the sharī'a as to which the Kurds belong, I shall now attempt to recount what I experienced during my relatively short stay in Southern Kurdistan in order to throw light on matters concerning divorce and polygamy. I take these two phenomena together for, as will appear below, they are interwoven, and the one is often the reason for the other.

At the time I was able to study the conditions, there was in each of the three or four homes of the village aristocracy that constitute my material for comparison, only one wife. This happened to be so in the case of the sheikh families in Topzawa, Bergalu, Shaikala and Serkan. Eagle[590] states that the Kurds from north to south are monogamous, an assertion repeated by his wife[591]. This does not quite accord with my experience. In Topzawa the current wife had five children aged 18, 17, 13, 8 and 6. In the home there was also a step-daughter of 12. As illegitimate children are unknown in the Kurdish pattern of life, the sheikh, within a period lying between 1938 and 1945, has had two wives for a shorter or longer period, and the one who only presented him with one child was sent home to her parents.

The sister of the present one, about 25 years of age, was married to an old sheikh in Shaikala. There appears here to have been a succession of marriages. Several groups of married sons with wives and

[illegible] children living in the home showed that there were here three wives. The sheikh himself stated that in his long life he had been married nineteen times! This can be compared with a statement by Hay[illegible] about "Ghat Ibrahim, Agha of the Ghiaty", who, 70 years old, had had nineteen wives. So far as I could discover the position was the same as that reported by Lorimer[illegible]: "Divorce is often frequent, when a man who has already one wife wishes to marry another girl or woman, the father of the latter, or the female herself who is sought in marriage, will not consent to the union unless the first wife be previously divorced". But even if the man divorces his present wife or swallows in the middle of the new wife or her family, the children remain in the paternal home, which, when they marry, the sons occupy as a joint family household.

Two half-grown 13-14 year old stepdaughters with the sheikh of Sargala marked the existence of an earlier marriage, as did the presence in town of three married sons of the sheikh in Sarbun. Of this family it was said that not only the sheikh but also his wife had been married before, she being the widow of his brother—thus a case of levirate marriage. Among the village aristocracy I thus was able to determine divorces, remarriages of marriages, and children of former marriages remaining in the home, but in this milieu I did not meet several wives simultaneously in the home.

In the humble village milieu it seemed that monogamy was the more usual, probably for economic reasons. On the other hand I met here two cases of women who, taking with them their small children—a boy of 2 and a girl of 4 in Tripoune, and a male baby and girl of 5, both of whom later died, in Sarbun—had left their husbands who had failed in their obligations in regard to maintaining them. They had been taken on as domestic help[illegible] at the sheikh's homes in Tripoune and Sarbun. Thus the women had not returned to their families. A repudiated wife with a boy of about 2 in the humble village milieu in Balkha was said to live with and be supported by her family.

In the educated urban milieu I met a newly-married teacher couple (who met each other before marriage), and a teacher couple with two children (never were each other before marriage). The latter were monogamous, as was the case with the former, and a very high sum was stated to be put aside for the young woman in the event of divorce (or widowhood).

There remain conditions to what is called the modernized urban milieu or, if one prefers it, the old-fashioned urban milieu which still retains its original economic domain of Western inhabitants. The milieu of this kind that I learned to know possessed a good economic basis and was represented by small traders in Sulaimani and Kirkuk, who acted as agents for Baghdad firms dealing in electrical articles, bicycles and spare parts for automobiles. From the point of view of trade they represented the new times, but the structure of their homes evinced the old. Here I met polygamy functioning and could observe its effects on daily life, in the arrangement of the home, the distribution of the man's interest in regard to the wives, relations with the other's children, and the distribution of work within the women's world of the home. There were only two wives. One thing is the permission given by the Koran to possess up to four wives simultaneously, another thing is practice—which presupposes—when these four are represented by female slaves, also permitted by the Koran—both individual wealth and economic means, and was consequently very definitely an upper class phenomenon, reserved to

991 case of bereavement and need. This obligation supposedly passes to nearest agnatic male relative, but practice is in fact very elastic, and follows reasonable arguments of residence and means.

Since each household is generally based on one elementary family, the marriage tie is the pivot on which household organization rests.

994 The verbalized theory on choice of spouse is quite simple. A man decides he wants to marry a certain girl — any girl. He chooses a reliable representative — preferably an older male relative — and the representative visits the father of the girl and makes the proposition. Considerable subtle diplomacy is performed by both sides in fixing a tentative brideprice. If the young man accepts the price, preparations proceed. The importance of the representative is evidently considerable. In one case, a laborer who was a stranger in the area chose to send two representatives he did not know very well to a potential father-in-law whom he in fact knew better. The answer seems to lie in the better bargaining position of an outsider — he is freer to eulogize the virtues of the groom.

• 992 Theoretically, you may propose to marry any girl. In practice, there is a strong preference for FaBrDa marriage. Certainly a FaBrDa is considered to have first right of refusal. The case of the above mentioned transient laborer brings out the point: He was refused because, said the girl's father «I am afraid my brother's sons will kill me if I give her to you».[1])

The rationalizations and manifest reasons for this preferential marriage pattern are of several types. The father's interest in his daughter is used as an explanation for his preference of a BrSo as a son-in-law: he knows the nephew's possible shortcomings, which reduces the risk of mis-matching; furthermore, he would be able to exert some influence over the groom after marriage, through the agnatic kinship tie, to protect his daughter's interests. It is further usually said that «it is customary» for the nephew to pay only a

[1]) The same transient laborer had on a previous occasion in northern Iraq been refused a girl on similar grounds, although in this case he threatened to murder her if she was not given to him. The girl was indeed killed shortly afterwards, and the laborer spent a period of time in jail till he was released due to lack of evidence.

enforced bridegrim, or some or all, so from the point of view of the potential groom, the incentive to cousin marriage is considerable. No rationalization of the pattern in terms of the Kawain approval of close kin marriage was ever advanced in conversation on the subject — in fact, the contrary was occasionally claimed. — We shall return later to some more basic factors relating to this marriage pattern.

Any special preference for FaBrDa as against the other three types of cousins was denied, and the higher incidence of FaBrDa marriage was explained by the fact that there were more of them. This is in fact true, so far as the local village is concerned. A certain amount of inter-village marriage does take place. Marriage being ambilocal in the man's village or occasionally patrilocal, all Fabr's children will be living in your own village, whereas a certain number of those related to you through a female will reside in other villages.

The frequency of marriage with actual, non-classificatory cousins is very high, ranging around 60 % in many of the villages studied (see Table 1). Considering that any irregularity in sex or age distributions of cousins must affect the opportunities for cousin marriage adversely, 60 % is probably close to the practical maximal frequency which such a marriage form can ever attain.

A second type of marriage is the like-for-like (= sister exchange). In such cases of course the bride price is eliminated by the reciprocity of the two men exchanging their sisters with one another, and only the expenses immediately connected with the marriage celebrations and ceremonies remain. From the purely financial point of view, the sister exchange is thus advantageous, and may in a sense be regarded as an extension of the FaBrDa marriage pattern within the village community. In the non-tribal villages, such marriages are fairly frequent. On other counts, however, they are not considered too satisfactory. Where no close kin ties exist between the two men performing the exchange, the chances of disruption of the unions are increased: sibling loyalties are of the same order of magnitude as loyalty between spouses, so domestic difficulties in the one household are said to produce similar conflicts in the other household, in a vicious circle.

The Hutu do have an frequently divided into subsections called Ama [illegible], though in many districts the two terms appear to be interchangeable. The Batwa/Twa Hutu subjects to Tutsi are for instance subdivided into three Ama each group claiming descent from one of the sons of Nkima Nyoni. These sons [illegible] did not obtain equal status but appear to have arrived respectively in Bungo, Ndiza and Buhi, and these villages remain the centres of their respective Ama to the present day. Thus the Ama of Buhi is descendant of a number of villages in Kirhoe of the Buhi Buhi he is head of the Ama. The Buhi Hutu in relation subdivided into three Ama, the names being given to me as Buhi Ama, Buhi Bwami and Bwami Bukombe Ama - these being presumably the names of the ancestral founders of the lineage. On the other hand some persons in Buhi did not seem to be closely aware of this subdivision and so being asked the name of their Ama would reply "Buhi Hutu". Moreover I was assured by one informant that there is no difference between Hutu and Tutsi, but that the one is higher than the other. This is I think an extreme description. Hutu is a form of address given fairly frequently encountered by anthropologists, usually human lineage, but more rarely associated by Hutu as lineage, it differs only from the Ama group in scale and political relations. With the loosening of political ties the distinction between the two types of grouping tends to disappear. The Ama of Buhi for instance claimed to be one Ama of his own Hutu and no mark of equal rank to Buhi Bukombe Ama of Nzinda. Buhi Bukombe of course did not admit this claim but maintained that Buhi, Ama of Buhi was Ama subject.

From this description and the examples quoted it is clear that the terms subject, Hutu and Tutsi into the normal anthropological classifications of kin, clan and lineage [illegible], with the single exception that the clans are in this case endogamous, or largely so.

Inheritance of land Tenure

The settlements for the most part consist of small villages [pod] scattered along the valleys. The term pod really includes both the homestead the cultivation surrounding them and may or them grass enclosing. The pod of Bangwinya for instance contains two houses only, that of Bangwinya has over a hundred. Every pod is the "property" of a landlord [Afin]. If the Afin owns only the pod or is the case of Buhi male Afin of Bangwinya he will live on it himself; if

"The Lineage Farm - Finance and Accounting in the Patrilineal Clans of a small-farm community in Southern Rhodesia J.R.A.I. Vol. 69: 314.

E.P.Wilson - No. the Village.(??).

Note however that owing to the rule of virilocal marriage, Buhi Hutu and Tutsi tend to be endogamous rather than exogamous.

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[illegible] economy stayed the British expedient of paying the tribal rulers an annual salary provided they kept their tribe in order. This procedure admirably gave the tribal rulers an important [illegible] and has had decisive repercussions which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

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The salary granted to Daniel Kalemeni of Ndola was stopped some years ago and, as might be expected, his influence as tribal leader declined rapidly. As an ornament to the tribal rulers of Ngoni and Bemba tribal stock, the Ndola has economic and functioning unity as a tribe at the present time, though Daniel Kalemeni with a wide group of his own, still declares that all the land belongs to him and that the tribes of Kamba and Soko are only [illegible] as subjects. At the present moment (1959) his prestige is [illegible], as the upstarts above he has recently been appointed a "Member of Parliament" and regularly attends the legislative assembly in Lusaka. The appointment carries with it a small salary, but its real importance is far as the tribes are concerned is that it demonstrates that the latter is in favour with the Government and with the higher authorities.

Kinship Structure

While I have been sketching out the apparently political structure of the community the real nature of the relationship between the various Ngoni and their followers was only to [illegible] in terms of kinship.

The essentially traditional nature of the Ngoni authority was only vaguely understood by the earlier British administrators. One for instance remarks (p. 47) "The Ngoni are very suspicious by their nature, more especially where the Government is close at hand and can assert its authority. In the meantime districts the tribesmen are exceedingly poor, they have little to fear from the Government, and their chief finds it difficult to coerce them. A rival chief would probably soon appear if he did". This statement brings out the fact, already well known from examples in the African field, that Government support for "the Chief" frequently gives that individual a [illegible] authority quite foreign to the ordinary tribal system of government, but it does not explain the Ngoni moral relationship to his followers.

Marriage of Commoners

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As we have seen already the Ngoni is essentially a patrilineal clan. It is moreover largely endogamous by virtue of the system of sister-exchange marriage common to most Bantu-speaking societies. Reference to the table of Kinship Terminology at the end of this book

[illegible] Informant's [illegible] Informants [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In the Ideal, the Kachin family which maintains orthocousin marriage and does not require the wife to change her place of residence on marriage forms what may be termed a "functional" group. Brothers are close neighbours or even share the same house. They frequently work their landholdings jointly, perhaps even in cooperation with their cousins. The marriage of orthocousins closely serves to simplify and perpetuate such cooperation. However in such a case the bridegroom, whatever the original amount - and the Kachin are keen to flatter their wives by asserting that they have paid a quite fabulous price for them - is in practice setting up a work of bride wealth, a transfer of assets from the right hand to the left. Even where the marriage is Father's Brother's Daughter does not take place, there is still a strong tendency for a man to marry a girl from his own village - i.e. a quasi-lineage "orthocousin" - if for no other reason than that the elders most approve of all marriages and so have an obvious interest in keeping the group as closely unified as possible. Rather, a man of the commoner class would normally have opportunity for opportunities of either meeting or bargaining for a girl from another village, while even for a girl of another clan or tribe. Courting ceremonies and elopements do take place, but they are the exception and are usually followed by a long and bloody train of vengeance. For the commoner the general rule of marriage within the bride is fairly well maintained. In this connection the building of the road will probably have important consequences for the Kachin in the near future, since the military tolerance can now much more readily make contact with groups other than the own immediate district.

Marriage of Aghas

The foregoing applies however only to the marriage arrangements of commoner families (Dumsa). Quite different are the conditions that govern the marriage of the son of an Agha. Kachin law permits a man to have four wives at a time, and to effect dynastic policy by the procurement of the most suitable three wives. In practice scarcely any of the commoners among the Kachin can afford more than one wife, and polygyny is the almost exclusive prerogative of the Aghas. The marriage to Father's brother's daughter serves to simplify and concentrate the inheritance of cattle, implements and other items of "capital" equipment within the economic setting unit of the group household and to avoid friction over the inheritance of tenancy rights. But the Agha is not swayed by considerations of inheritance alone, as the limited means already described, he "owns" all the available land anyway and there is no question of splitting up the territory at death. His aim rather is to gain prestige and live at peace with his neighbours. We find therefore that the marriages of Aghas tend to take the form of political alliances, rather after the style of the royal marriages of mediaeval Europe. Kachin Kumsawn Agha of Kutsa for instance, who in the course of a long life has had 9 wives and 15 surviving children, appears to be related either by marriage or